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La Mettrie's essay itself is of great interest. As against the rationalistic dualism of Descartes the empirical materialism of La Mettrie is overwhelmingly convincing. The contentions of *L'Homme Machine* are, indeed, for the most part the commonplaces of later science. Not only is sense experience immediately dependent on the mechanical functioning of our bodies, but so equally is the most abstract thought of the philosopher and the noblest virtue of the saint. A clot of blood on the brain can reduce a genius to imbecility or a hero to a human monster. One cannot with Descartes explain the reflex and instinctive acts of men as due to the mechanism of the nervous system and still maintain the independence of reason. One cannot on physiological grounds deny an immortal soul to animals and claim it for man. All living organisms are mechanisms through and through. A heart cut from the body continues to beat and after it has ceased will begin again if plunged into hot water. So a bit of muscular fiber contracts when mechanically stimulated long after its nervous connection with the brain is severed. Descartes' comparison of the body to such a piece of mechanism as a Diana in a grotto mysteriously moved by water forced through pipes which can be turned on and off at will by the operator at the center does violence to the facts. Each separate organ, each bit of tissue, functions spontaneously, and the intelligence of the behavior of the organism as a whole is nothing but the coordination and mutual adjustment of these functions. Since there is no function left for a transcendent soul to perform, we have no reason to believe in its existence. La Mettrie's doctrine is a materialism comparable to that of Tyndall or Huxley. There is only one substance in existence—namely what we call matter, but since we must attribute all these functions to matter, it is not the passive extension which Descartes conceived it to be. It is the source of unknown potentialities and its nature is incomprehensible to us.

One cannot read the essay today without coming to the conclusion that in almost every point at issue La Mettrie was justified as against his opponents; and yet one is surprised at oneself in making this admission. Most of us are descended from a philosophical ancestry far removed from the succession of physiologists to which La Mettrie belonged. We have been used to looking upon materialism as a comprehensive name for the crudest form of dogmatism; but time works strange revenges and we stand today closer to La Mettrie's empirical monism than to the dogmatic dualism of Descartes or Locke. Ten or fifteen years ago this could not have been said. Then the conflicting theories of parallelism and interactionism offered themselves as the sole alternatives. Now both are discredited, and no one today can approach the problem of the relation of mind and body save from the standpoint of the essential unity of the psycho-physical organism.

GRACE ANDRUS DE LAGUNA.

Festskrift tillegnad Edvard Westermarck. Helsingfors, 1912.—pp. 304.

This is a *Festschrift* by Professor Edward Westermarck's London and Helsingfors pupils, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. Papers have also been contributed by his former teacher, Dr. Th. Rein, ex-Chancellor of the Helsing-

fors University, and by Dr. A. C. Haddon, and Dr. W. H. R. Rivers. While the book is largely a contribution to ethnology and anthropology, it nevertheless contains considerable material of value to philosophical workers in the logic of the social sciences, social psychology, religion, moral evolution, and kindred subjects.

"The Economic Aspect of the Intichiuma Ceremonies," by B. Malinowski, is a suggestive interpretation of Spencer and Gillen's and Strehlow's accounts of the Australian intichiuma ceremonies. Upon the ground that since these ceremonies have for their purpose the increase of the food supply, and involve organization, collective effort, regular application of energy and division of labor, the hypothesis is advanced that such ceremonies as these have been the means by which totemic peoples have been educated in the direction of economic labor. This suggestion, developed further here than by Frazer, seems plausible, and leads one to wonder if the moral aspects of these ceremonies do not deserve similar consideration.

"The Disappearance of Useful Arts," by W. H. R. Rivers, shows that useful arts once in the possession of various peoples in Oceanica have subsequently been lost by them. This is specifically illustrated in the case of pottery, the canoe, and the bow and arrow. Ordinary utilitarian explanations, like the absence of raw material and the death of craftsmen, are in most instances insufficient. To supplement them, Dr. Rivers suggests the hypothesis that religious and magical factors must also have been operative. In Oceanica it is not enough to know how to manufacture a canoe; one must also be able to perform the necessary and elaborate magical and religious rites. The disappearance of useful arts through the death of craftsmen may have been due, not merely to loss of their manual skill, but as well to the loss of the spiritual power, the *mana*, which they alone could bring into operation. This whole question is important in showing that we need not infer that islands must once have been connected with the main land because their present human inhabitants are devoid of means of transportation, and in warning us against overestimating the importance of utilitarian motives in cultures widely different from our own.

"The Clan as a Local Unit in Society," by Rud. Elander, is a defence of the position suggested by this title, taken in his volume "The Chief of the Indian Clan in North America," in reply to the criticisms of Dr. Lönborg.

Rudolf Holsti, in "Some Superstitious Customs and Beliefs in Primitive Warfare," takes to task a large group of ethical and sociological writers, both militarists and anti-militarists, who, although confessing that warfare between modern civilized nations involves too many factors to admit of so simple an analysis, have taken for granted, without troubling to investigate the facts, that among primitive peoples warfare has been a direct agency of natural selection. A large mass of evidence, supported by a great wealth of citations in the manner of Westermarck, is presented to show that natural selection operates in no such direct fashion in primitive warfare. On the contrary, magic, omens, and supernatural beliefs and practices of every sort are the

most conspicuous and dominating factors in determining the conduct and outcome of primitive warfare, the natural actions of men being reduced to subordinate influence and importance. So it cannot be claimed that the groups defended by the ablest warriors necessarily survive.

"The Conception of the Causal Relation in Sociological Science," by Gerald Camden Wheeler, argues that the cause-effect relation can be approximated in the *ideo-graphic* or historical sciences, using Windelband's expression only to the extent that the element of unique changes can be neglected, and identical recurrences can be assumed to take place. This can best be done in Ethnology, where the slowness of the changes among the cultures studied renders them negligible. Ethnology, however, suffers from 'flatness,' want of depth in time, in consequence of this monotony. Ethnological phenomena must therefore be reconstructed in a temporal succession in order to render a causal interpretation possible. Graebner and his school are credited with having in some measure indicated how this is to be done. But Mr. Wheeler does not make it clear how social sciences can both ignore the teleological movement in history which he regards as irreducible to a causal series, and at the same time avoid the 'flatness' mentioned.

The article in the volume having most philosophical interest, especially for the logic of the *Geisteswissenschaften* and for the philosophical side of social psychology, is "*Die Stellung der anthropogeographischen Synthese in der Soziologie und Geschichtsphilosophie*" by K. R. Brotherus. While geographical conditions have been important in determining the phenomena both of sociology and history, they are difficult of interpretation, and the investigator is prone to read his own subjective experience into the facts. For this reason the employment of geographical explanations in the literature dealing with the origin of races and the explanation of traits of national character have been largely unsuccessful, and at best can only claim such subjective verification as the inner personal experiences of the investigators can furnish. In sociology, which deals with universal laws, and not with particular events and individual experiences, geographical explanations are not available. The situation in history is different. History, unlike sociology, is concerned with particular events, and not with universal laws. In the explanation of particular occurrences the influence of geographical conditions is significant and ascertainable, though not so potent as the innate characteristics and inclinations of human beings.

This writer insists that it is impossible to universalize geographical factors. In this connection he criticizes Ratzel and others who have tried to classify forms of culture by general types of geographical surroundings, such as islands. Such generalizations overlook the individual conditions that prevail in every locality and make it different from every other. The historian as an anthropogeographer must indeed reason in terms of cause and effect, but he cannot employ them as a natural scientist would, since in his field there always enters a teleological factor that cannot be universalized.

The philosophy of history, like history itself, posits values. Just as the

historian presents fragments of historical development that correspond to ethical values and illustrate their concrete realization, so the task of the philosopher of history is to find the realization of ethical values in history considered as a whole. The hypothesis that geographical conditions help determine historical events is of no significance for the task of the philosopher of history as thus stated. For this hypothesis does not define values, but only maintains that the environment helps to determine whether these values will appear in a realized form under given circumstances. The hypothesis, however, is utilizable in the type of questions suggested by the last statement. Does the influence of geographical factors, for it must be conceded that they have some influence, increase or diminish in history? Can man overcome geographical limitations and realize values where previously it was impossible for him to do so? Light can be thrown on such questions, provided they are made definite and specific, by drawing upon the history of agriculture, transportation, commerce, and *Kulturgeschichte*. In this manner the geographical hypothesis can be related to ideas of value, and positive content can be given to the problem thus developed in the philosophy of history.

This paper seems to me to be convincing in its general position that geographical explanations at present are only practically available in helping to explain when and where values happen to appear in realized form. But Mr. Brotherus seems to me to assume a rationalistic and transcendent theory of values that does not necessarily follow. Granted that accidental conditions of time and place do not create values of which the human spirit already knows, but only determines whether man can then and there achieve them, still we may ask how these values have arisen in the human consciousness in the first place. Must not geographical conditions have played their part in the discovery of the values, for instance, that Israel, Hellas and Rome first gave to the world; and is not the reason why we may now regard them as independent of local conditions simply because they are our heritage from a past which present conditions cannot alter? Mr. Brotherus does not face the question of the origin of values in the first place, although his treatment at times seems almost to suggest a Platonic view of their ontological existence apart from occurrences in historical time. However, this is not his main point, and we may concede to him that in the present stage of development of their disciplines it is practically impossible for anthropologist, sociologist, or philosopher of history to make sweeping generalizations on the basis of geographical conditions that are really more than their own subjective impressions.

The paper by Dr. A. C. Haddon, "The Houses of New Guinea," is a careful digest of the available knowledge on this subject with reference to the influence of totemism and like institutions in this region. Gunnar Landtman, in "Wanderings of the Dead in the Folk-Lore of the Kiwai-speaking Papuans," reports his own investigations into the spiritistic beliefs of these folk, and gives one the impression that among them a religion is slowly evolving from their close relations with their departed spirits. One wishes that his report indicated more clearly the bearing of his observations upon general questions of this

sort. Hose and McDougall in their recent work upon the natives of Borneo have set an example in this respect that it is to be hoped may be more generally followed by field investigators.

The remaining articles in the volume are: "Allmänna opinionen," by Dr. Th. Rein, and papers by Professor Westermarck's pupils at Helsingfors, viz.: Thure Svedlin, "Om olika slag af tvekamp i Norden"; Ola Castrén, "Sammhällsuppfattningen hos Bernard Mandeville"; Rolf Lagerborg, "Platons kvinnopolitik"; J. J. Sederholm, "Hutton och Werner"; and Yrjö Hirn, "Pappersdraken."

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Beauty and Ugliness, and Other Studies in Psychological Æsthetics. By VERNON LEE and C. ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON. London, John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1912.—pp. xvi+376.

The chief author of this volume is the well-known essayist—in private life, Violet Paget. Readers of her numerous volumes on art and appreciation may be in some measure prepared for this collection of more serious studies in æsthetic theory. But although the author brings to her task a wide experience and a keen æsthetic sensibility, she appears to possess few of the qualifications for scientific exposition. It was in 1897 that the essay which furnishes the title to the present volume first appeared in *The Contemporary Review*. At that time Miss Paget was but slightly familiar with modern literature on æsthetics. This she tells us in reiterated passages and footnotes. Indeed, the book is scarcely more than a commentary which aims to correct and enlarge upon the central thesis which the original article sought to maintain.

The thesis in question was based largely upon the introspective observations of Miss Anstruther-Thomson, who collaborated only in the original work. This lady appears to be a person of pronounced motor type, and the analyses of her acts of appreciation in the presence of works of art reveal a wealth of mimetic elements, chiefly of breathing and equilibrium. The conclusion first reached was that the active experience of these movements furnishes the basis for the feelings of pleasure and displeasure which characterize the sense of beauty and ugliness,—the Lange-James theory of emotion being found to supply the needed psychological substantiation for such a conclusion. The article came to the attention of Theodore Lipps, who reviewed it with sharp criticism. This served to introduce Miss Paget to the doctrine of empathy, as expounded in Lipps's familiar writings. She also made the acquaintance, then, of Karl Groos and other German æstheticians, including some experimental work, especially that of Külpe and his pupils. As a result of this enlightenment, the chief author of the work on *Beauty and Ugliness* has modified her views, and here sets them forth with becoming modesty in five supplementary essays.

The first of the group, entitled "Anthropomorphic Æsthetics," emphasizes the "discovery of the projection of our inner experience into the forms which we